(I am bumping this story back to the top as it is rather significant and now the mainstream media is starting to report on it. Just remember - you heard it here first lol)
A new document has been unclassified through a FOIA request by the National Security Archive.
A series of war games held in 1999 specifically to anticipate problems following an invasion of Iraq assumed a deployment of 400,000 troops to maintain order, seal borders and provide for other security needs. But the games, known as Desert Crossing, were apparently ignored by the Defense Department. When CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, after his retirement, advised planners to refer back to Desert Crossing as they prepared for the 2003 invasion, the response reportedly was, "Never heard of it."
Now, seven years later, documentation on preparations for the games and detailed After Action records have surfaced in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive, which is posting the materials on its Web site today.
This is very damaging to the administration and Pentagon. It also supports the claims by General Shinseki regarding the higher level of troops needed. Even more damming is the assessment of dealing with Iraq after the topple of Saddam:
The results of Desert Crossing, however, drew pessimistic conclusions regarding the immediate possible outcomes of such action. Some of these conclusions are interestingly similar to the events which actually occurred after Saddam was overthrown. (Note 1) The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to "rival forces bidding for power" which, in turn, could cause societal "fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines" and antagonize "aggressive neighbors." Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments. An exit strategy, the report said, would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Saddam Iraq among those involved in the conflict.
The Desert Crossing report was similarly pessimistic when discussing the nature of a new Iraqi government. If the U.S. were to establish a transitional government, it would likely encounter difficulty, some groups discussed, from a "period of widespread bloodshed in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies." The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.
In other words - an insurgency was highly predictable. Remember when Rumsfeld downplayed the prediction of an insurgency on Meet the Press last year? Well here you got top military leaders, who ran through a simulation of this in 1999 predicting exactly that, plus a wrath of secular violence.
The worse part is this:
The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force.
How many times have we heard "a free and democratic Iraq" from Bush? The military and senior analysts knew this would not be feasible.
Just a little over a month ago, we heard this news:
Donald Rumsfeld's Iraqi war plan worked beautifully for three weeks. U.S. troops quickly deposed Saddam Hussein and captured Baghdad with a relatively small force and with lightning speed.
But with Iraq on the verge of civil war three years later, the secretary of defense now admits that no one was well-prepared for what would happen after major combat ended.
"Well, I think that anyone who looks at it with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight has to say that there was not an anticipation that the level of insurgency would be anything approximating what it is," Rumsfeld told CNN for the documentary, "CNN Presents Rumsfeld -- Man of War," which debuts Saturday at 8 p.m. ET.
No Mr. Rumsfeld - no one would have predicted it. No one except the military leadership during the Clinton administration.
Update #1:
The AP has picked up on this story now and are reporting on it. This should help get its way into the mainstream media and hopefully we will hear more about it on the cable news channels tomorrow.









Comments
Paul Wolfowitz and General Richard Myers ignored the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force which would have made for a much greater chance for success.
Thomas Blanton, the Director of the National Security Archive, made the remarkable conclusion, just 2 days before the midterm elections and within a few hours of receiving the transcript of Desert Crossing that..."we WOULD have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on the ground."
problem is, that's not what Desert Crossing concluded. It's conclusions, as published by AP state that multiple conditions COULD be troublesome even with 400,000 troops. There is a whale of a difference beteween "could" and "would" and the use of "would" by Mr. Blanton, I am sure was carefully chosen. Let's read the entire transcript before we let Mr. Blanton and AP tell us what it says in its entirety. Desert Crossing SHOULD have been studied by the ignorant gentlemen I referenced earlier...and even if it were, it was ignored.
This should have preceeded the comments that already are posted.
It is important to remember that prior to the 2003 invasion, 3 DefSecs (Cheney, Perry and Cohen) and 3 JCS Chairmen (Powell, Shalikashvili and Shelton)had signed off on contingency plans for an invasion of Iraq with around 400,000 troops. As detailed in Cobra II, written by retired Marine General Bernard Trainor and published early this year, General Zinni called together 70 of the best minds he could find to conduct Desert Crossing for CENTCOM. This was just prior to Zinni turning over his command to General Tommy Franks. Zinni wanted Franks to have every ounce of thinking and conjecture available involving both an invasion phase and a "post invasion" phase of Iraq.
The simulation showed serious concerns as outlined in today's news but NOTHING in the material published so far indicates that 400,000 troops WOULD not have been enough. Needless to say, all prior planning for such an invasion was immediately dismissed by Rumsfeld on and after September 13, 2001, when Rumsfeld requested the contingency planning for Iraq.
Whether aware of Desert Crossing or not (and if they read it they ignored it) Donald Rumsfeld and the parrots on his shoulders, Steve Cambone
Rumsfeld Fired. Ding Dong the Witch is Dead!!!
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